I am obviously terminally dim for I’m missing something here:
What, exactly, does this achieve?
Anti-terrorism police are confident they have the key men involved
in custody – one of them suffering from 90 per cent burns after
smashing a Jeep, packed with petrol and gas canisters, into the
terminal at Glasgow.
1) Everyone is in custody already.
2) What use is a sub-machine gun? Is he goingto open fire on someone driving erratically near an airport? If so, aren’t false positives more likely than not? If not, why have him?
Max Hastings is also sceptical:
Pity anyone who must catch a plane or visit Wimbledon today, or
indeed for many days to come. Following Friday’s London bombs and
Saturday’s attack at Glasgow airport, security checks have intensified
dramatically. Everybody engaged in what is now a vast industry wants to
be seen to be trying harder.
It is another matter, of course,
whether all the conspicuous activity that follows a terrorist incident
adds a jot to public safety, to compensate for the huge economic cost
it imposes. Most security precautions represent a charade. It is
probably a politically necessary charade – we will explore that issue
in a moment. But we should be sceptical about its practical value.
Gesture
security attained its nadir in February five years ago, with the
deployment of armoured vehicles at Heathrow. It was possible to accept
that the security service and police possessed plausible intelligence
that terrorists were preparing to attack an aircraft with a missile. It
was impossible, however, to believe light tanks could play a useful
part in preventing such an action. Aircraft landing or taking off are
within comfortable range of a missile fired from well outside any
airport perimeter. Even if an obliging member of al-Qaida knelt with
his launcher beside a runway, it is unlikely he could best be
frustrated by a 30mm cannon fired from the turret of a Scorpion.

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