Markets in Health Care

I rather owe Dr. Rant a response and while it’s taken me some time (the exigencies of making a crust) here it is.

We start out with this comment of mine on an earlier piece of his:

I think we need to realise that market mechanisms are anathema to any health service, and increase transaction costs rather than health gain.

Ooops, fallen at the first fence there. Better luck next time, eh?

He has now responded here. I have to say I rather like his use of diabetes as an analogy. I also agree that what are currently called markets within the NHS aren’t really all that much like markets and aren’t necessarily helping matters.

But if I can take a step back and witter on a little about the background?

If you squint at the subject in the right way you can look at modern economics as starting from the assumption that markets do work. Everybody then rolls up their sleeves and tries to find those times and places when they don’t. One example might be George Akerlof who won the Nobel for his work on asymmetric information. Briefly, the seller of a used car knows whether it is a clunker or not. The buyer doesn’t. So the seller will be demanding a high price for the non-clunker while the buyer will value it at the clunker price (yes, it’s more than this but, this is a blog post), meaning that there will not be an agreement on price and thus the market for used cars will not exist. Yet clearly it does exist, even if not as efficient as a market without such asymmetric information.

One answer to which is that many such market failures have their own market solutions: paying £50 to the AA to get them to check out the car is one such.

But certainly, the subject of economics as a whole (certain branches, like the Austrians, not so much) does not insist that markets work perfectly everywhere. There are such things as externalities (pollution, CO2, noise, congestion) which require outside intervention to allow the market to work: at a more basic level we need such things as property rights, contract law and so on to allow any market to work.

One source of much confusion is this idea of "free markets". At the most basic level these have not ever existed, do not now and never will. All markets are constrained by laws: they might be customary (Yup, Fred owns that field so if you pay him you can graze your sheep there), they might be legal (Yup, Fred’s got a piece of paper from the court saying that he owns that field), they might be legislative (Yup, Parliament passed a law stating that Fred owns that field) and so on. But there is no such thing as a market that is not constrained, is truly free, for without a basic agreement on who has what and how they’re going to be exchanged a market simply cannot exist.

So, to go back to the top, when I say that the rejection of market mechanisms is falling at the first fence I’m not suggesting that, in the case of human kidneys for transplant, that anyone turning up at a hospital with a bloodied kidney ripped untimely from its owner and a wedge of cash should be able to have it implanted. I might though, be advocating the restricted market in Iran, whereby the State pays some money (about a year’s average income) to the live donor and the recipient’s family a similar or larger sum. This system does seem to have created a situation where there is no waiting list in that country for kidney transplants.

An example of a market mechanism being of use in a health service?

Without turning this into a book length screed, there’s a few other economic points that might be made. Hayek pointed out that information is local…any medic will understand this. It’s you looking at the evidence in front of you, combined with 10-20 years of training and experience, which makes arriving at a diagnosis possible. It isn’t Patsy in the office in Whitehall. Thus decisions should also be taken locally, as far as is possible. Further, Hayek also pointed out that markets are the only method we have of processing the vast amounts of information available: there’s literally no way of feeding everything about desires, needs, available resources and so on into a system then allowing some central authority to make a decision.

We also need to remember that markets do not solely run on money. This very market we’re in now, blogging, runs on reputation for example.

There’s another strand running through modern economics which builds on the above. OK, so we have times and places where markets unadorned do not work. Now we need to think about the rules and strictures we might put in place so that they do. The biggest one of these at present is that over CO2 emissions. Thousands of people are debating whether cap and trade or carbon taxes are the way to go (no, I’m not going to go into the differences in outcomes of the two here) but all are agreeing that we want to bring that externality of CO2 emissions into the price system and thus into the market process.

(That "all" meaning all the people thinking seriously about the problem. Deep Greens insisting that we all become medieval peasants again I do not take to be serious.)

Which brings us back to the health care system. There are some 1.4 million in the NHS. This is simply too large an organization to be run under central diktat. Yes, while there are economies of scale there are also diseconomies and  it is information processing and the subsequent allocation of resources that cause some of them.

We thus want to have some of the information processing capabilities or markets added to that system. Note, please, that I’m not advocating "free markets", for, as above, they don’t exist. I am advocating serious thought about where, suitably constrained by  law, regulation, custom or practice, markets might help though.

At the trivial level the abolition of the national pay market would be a great start. If nurses in London or Manchester cannot afford to live in those cities then paying nurses in those cities more would be a very good idea to increase the number of nurses in said cities.

Medical treatment of course suffers from a large asymmetrical information problem. The general public really don’t know what they’re buying. When it’s idiot Greens recycling their fees  from The Independent to charlatans this isn’t too much of a problem. When it’s parent being misled by charlatans into not vaccinating their children, it is.

So we might think that an equivalent to our AA man system for used cars could be set up. Well trained people, acting as guides and gatekeepers to the system, pointing people in the direction of what they actually need, based upon valid information. You could, for example, call them General Practitioners.

It’s even possible that they could be the holders of the treatment money. Dr. Crippen has certainly said several times that as and when he’s able to pick and choose where his patients get treated (and make the money follow them) that one local psychiatry department isn’t going to get any of them.

Finally, one little point about transaction costs. There’s a whole economic literature on these, starting with Coase. Yes, it is possible that they make markets not work, if they are higher than the gains received from said markets. But this again depends upon exactly what the costs are and what the gains will be, relying in turn upon how we construct the markets, how we set the rules for them.

I’m not advocating what are commonly thought of as "free markets" in health care. I am stating my belief that the challenge is to create market mechanisms in health care, so that we get the best of what they have to offer. Thus my original point, that rejecting such mechanisms is falling at the first fence.

"Leave it to the market" in all and every circumstances is as insane a comment as "leave it to the Government" is. What we need to do is design the constraints, the incentives, of the market so that it does work for us.

I also admit that there are times and circumstances when this is not possible, also others where it is highly undesirable, but not that health care is one to the extent that market mechanisms are always and everywhere in that field an anathema.

Update: I see that Dr. Rant has this to say about markets:

The market works as follows outside health care:

1.  Companies need to make money in a saturated marketplace.

2.  They create demand for a product using advertising and other marketing techniques.

3.  They sell people stuff that they don’t need.

That’s the market.

Hmmm. I realize that Doctors are required to be intelligent (those four As at A level) and are also highly trained. But would it be fair to say that said intelligence and training is not quite as broad as it might be? That’s the sort of view of markets that would shame a teenage Marxist, would make even Citizen Smith blush in the days before he bought his beret.

Rather than my above pointers to Akerlof, Coase and the rest, perhaps the Good Doctor would be happier with Janet and John?

Anyone know if Ladybird ever did do an introduction to economics?

11 responses

  1. Very interesting post.
    I am less confident than you that “market mechanisms” applied within a system in which users have little power will necessarily improve things.
    However I think the reactions which the idea of marketising brings out in some qualified practitioners are illuminating. Commenting on Dr Rant’s post, The Shrink says: “Medics are not there to keep patients happy, making people happy is what clowns do. Thus, patient satisfaction measures whether what patients want has been addressed, not what patients medical needs have been addressed.” And Dr Rant says “Health care is not about ‘I want’. It is about what patients need.”
    In other words, paternalism (“doctor knows best”), decided on – what a surprise – by the suppliers.

  2. Don Lloyd Avatar
    Don Lloyd

    Tim,
    If you squint at the subject in the right way you can look at modern economics as starting from the assumption that markets do work. Everybody then rolls up their sleeves and tries to find those times and places when they don’t. One example might be George Akerlof who won the Nobel for his work on asymmetric information. Briefly, the seller of a used car knows whether it is a clunker or not. The buyer doesn’t. So the seller will be demanding a high price for the non-clunker while the buyer will value it at the clunker price (yes, it’s more than this but, this is a blog post), meaning that there will not be an agreement on price and thus the market for used cars will not exist. Yet clearly it does exist, even if not as efficient as a market without such asymmetric information.
    Unfortunately, Akerlof must be entirely ignorant of the fact that an economic good can have a use value, an exchange value, or both.
    Most typically, the individual seller of a used car is selling because he has acquired a new car. The new car takes over the use value, mobility, that the used car previously supplied.
    With a single driver, the used car now has a value that is limited to its much lower exchange value. In fact, an unsold used car often has significant storage/maintenance costs and may not even be legal to hold at home.
    The buyer, OTOH, may well be looking for use value, mobility, from the used car.
    Contrary to claim, a car that breaks down every day may still be of more use value to the buyer than the exchange value of a perfect car to the seller, in accordance with the law of diminishing marginal utility of a second car possessed.
    Regards, Don
    Tim adds: Don, I have a feeling that the fault is in my explanation of the point, not Akerlof’s theory, which did after all garner that Nobel.

  3. Don Lloyd Avatar
    Don Lloyd

    Tim,
    Tim adds: Don, I have a feeling that the fault is in my explanation of the point, not Akerlof’s theory, which did after all garner that Nobel.
    I wouldn’t be so quick to make that assumption. A Nobel prize will probably never be granted unless it either largely agrees with the current concensus or the concensus has moved to agreement.
    Regards, Don

  4. Mark Wadsworth Avatar
    Mark Wadsworth

    “1. Companies need to make money in a saturated marketplace.
    2. They create demand for a product using advertising and other marketing techniques.
    3. They sell people stuff that they don’t need.”
    Not entirely untrue – look at e.g. cosmetic surgery, designer babies, Caesarian sections, hair transplants, fertility treatment for lesbians etc. Doctors are just as guilty of this as anybody else.

  5. dearieme Avatar
    dearieme

    Gentlemen, gentlemen: the prize concerned was in Economics and is therefore only a quasi-Nobel.

  6. Luis Enrique Avatar
    Luis Enrique

    Well freah from my MSc module in public economics under the tutelage of CMPO luminaries Profs Propper & Grout, I ought to say something sensible here. Erm …
    well, one way of thinking about it is whether in the case of healthcare the incentives that operate in a market do more harm than good. If they do, then this means that the inefficiencies and other drawbacks of centrally administered public health may the price we have to pay, because the market based alternatives are worse.
    Some economists (have a read of Acemoglu et al, “Incentives in markets, firms and governments”) think that public provision has the edge where market style high powered incentives are a hindrance. In healthcare potentially undesirable responses to market incentives include ‘hotel services’ (spending money on things that attract customers but don’t help health) low incentives for preventative care, and competing to treat profitable patients and neglecting loss making ones (this can be a problem under regulated prices, where unless the regulator is a genius some prices will be ‘wrong’) and under unregulated care where the poor get stiffed by hospitals concentrating on the rich – even with vouchers, if you can top up that’s where the money will be.
    Another potential problem is that competition works best (this will be no surprise to you) when consumers can evaluate the combination of quality and price that they receive for themselves, and supply will bend to their preferences. With healthcare the problem is not so much knowing how good the treatment you received was (although that can be a major problem) but knowing what you need – which is a long way round of saying that under private provision, hospitals have incentives to provide unnecessary procedures. So for instance Acemoglu suggests that hotelling, not enough preventative care and unnecessary treatments explain why the US spends about 5 percentage points more of GDP that the UK for comparable health outcomes. I know paternalism is a dirty word, but sometimes people will not of their own volition choose (to pay for) treatments that really they ought to have (you can tell and externalities story here too if you like, or just higher costs down the road).
    In the UK I think you also have to question whether the full discipline of the market (i.e. crap hospitals are allowed to go bust) is ever going to be politically feasible.
    This doesn’t mean that market mechanisms are all bad, and plenty of studies find signs of improved price and quality combinations are associated with higher competition – higher heart attack survival rates for instance (google: Martin Gaynor competition in health care). There’s every chance that despite the potentially adverse reactions to market incentives, the UK patient choice led reforms, when its had a chance to mature, could still deliver net benefits by giving the worst hospitals a kick up the rear. And maybe other specific internal market mechanisms could bring about improvements in certain areas. But that question involves more detailed knowledge of the specific areas and specific mechanisms that I possess.
    Anyway, all I meant to do when I start this comment was to give you some examples of ways in which market mechanisms could have potential adverse consequences in health care.
    Tim adds: Whether I agree with them all is different from whether I think they’re valid points: which I do. The answers to them are empirical. My point is first to point out that “some” markets would be beneficial to health care. The blanket rejection is the fault, not the questioning of them in certain places.

  7. james C Avatar
    james C

    Some market mechanisms are indeed anathema to any health service.
    One of these is the incentive private insurers have to exclude high risk patients. This is entirely rational from the perspective of the insurer, but results in extra costs to the system as a whole.
    Tim adds: I’m even prepared to go that far, that some market mechanisms are. But not all, which was Dr. Rant’s contention.

  8. Tim
    Good article.
    Medicine has potential for both supplier induced demand and demand induced supply.
    For example as a doctor I know there is much undiscovered illness amongst British people. So (if I had spare space in the colonoscopy suite) I would spread the word (information diffusion) that “colon cancer is common, often presents too late and shouldn’t you have a colonoscopy (At £400 per time) to make sure you haven’t got it? Scared now? Ready to listen? MY address is £10000000 Harley Street. The NHS stops this kind of crude medical entrepenurialism as it keeps doctors over loaded with what needs to be done and keeps us away from drumming up extra trade for ourselves. David Healy, IOna Heath, Ray Moynihan all speak about “disease mongering.” If you push doctors out into a pure market we’ll disease monger very profitably, at the public’s expense.
    There is some demand induced supply in the NHS, but it’s slow to happen. For example NHS direct may meet a need. However the need could have been met by giving an extra nurse/health advisor to each GP in the country rather than taking lots of senior nurses away from the front line and making them work away from local knowledge and records, and instead work in a stand apart information vacuum.
    In medicine we do value need for treatment over want for treatment. As one of our Psychiatry profs said, “Anyone who wants to see a psychiatrist must be mad.” He thought the people he needed to see were the ones who had lost contact with reality and had been dragged up to him by relatives/police etc.
    We also value universal coverage as a social good, and a means of boosting social capital. If NHS goes the rich will buy the best treatment, and as a doctor I’ll move and provide it for them.

  9. james c Avatar
    james c

    ‘Tim adds: I’m even prepared to go that far, that some market mechanisms are. But not all, which was Dr. Rant’s contention.’
    If he believes that, good luck to him.

  10. Dr Blue
    “We also value universal coverage as a social good, and a means of boosting social capital. If NHS goes the rich will buy the best treatment, and as a doctor I’ll move and provide it for them.”
    We also view universal supply of food as a social good. We left it to the market and then provided those who couldn’t afford to buy food with the means to buy it.
    As a result, no-one starves. Food is cheap, plentiful and with a huge variety from across the globe.
    If we could do something about the supply of people in the medical profession (like lowering the barrier) then maybe we might see that £400 colonoscopy fall to something closer to what a CORGI registered plumber charges per hour.

  11. “As a result, no-one starves. Food is cheap, plentiful and with a huge variety from across the globe.”
    That’s the NHS we have now! Want people want and actually deserve is QUALITY food – not just lots of it. The NHS is a big plate of chips……
    As for PLUMBERS – when they have to work in expensive, clean premises with expensive sterile tools and have to pay a nurse £20 per hour to hold their spanners AND insure themselves at great expense in case someone dies and they get sued – the costs may become eqivalent.
    Until then consider this: Is there an under supply of plumbers, and hence do THEY cost more than they should?

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